Though Francesco Patrizi began his philosophical studies with Aristotelianism, he became well known during the Renaissance era until modern times for his Anti-Aristotelianism views. He published works against Aristotle and his followers during his lifetime, and a few of these Anti-Aristotelian works included his arguments regarding the natural philosophy and metaphysics that were either distinctly opposite with Aristotelian views or nuanced views that affected scientifical, physical, and metaphysical arguments of later on philosophers
In the publication Philosophia de rerum natura (Philosophy on the nature of things) of Francesco Patrizi in 1587, he had given the concept of physical space and mathematical space. Patrizi elaborated the ideal of a “physical space” in his publication De spacio physico (On physical space, in which he had refused most of the Aristotelian metaphysics on the idea of “place (Locus)” and offered his own interpretations on space.
Starting his philosophy on physical space, Patrizi firstly argued that space exists before everything except the creator God himself (Patrizi 225). In order to reach this conclusion, Patrizi analyzed if all things, whether corporeal or not, are in space: if all the things are existing in somewhere, then space should exist as the “somewhere” before all things that the creator God can put things in somewhere (Patrizi 226-7). This reasoning of the existing space could be supplemented with an example of our body. The body is “surrounded by and filled with” space, from three dimensions of length, width, and depth (Patrizi 226.) Length, width, and depth are three dimensions of space that existed in mathematical and natural things (such as the human body), which could be perceived by ourselves by observing distances between objects; the three dimensions of space will change in respect with the object itself, yet they will never disappear (Patrizi 228). Since the three dimensions of space appeared along with the human body, Patrizi inferred that it is possible for the three dimensions to be essentially the property of our body (Patrizi 228). From there, it could be said that space does exist as a matter of fact. Patrizi also criticized the idea of Locus (place) held by Aristotle, in which Aristotle defined Locus as the surface of the body that covered the body; Locus defined by Aristotle is therefore only being granted with two dimensions to form a surface that is made of length and width (Patrizi 229). The problem of the two-dimensional Locus could be seen by a plane coordinate system of x, y, and z-axis representing the three dimensions of our world. Assume the center point of the rock to be the placement of the rock, it is clear that the position of the rock could not be identified when the rock could only be seen from the x-axis and the y-axis, in which it is impossible to determine the distance from the origin of coordinates to the rock’s position. It is then reasonable to conclude that Locus should be three-dimensional. As Patrizi also noted, Locus is fixed, because it is separated from the Locatum (space of the body) as the body could move and change while the Locus remains still (Patrizi 230-1). Locus is not a body since a body cannot physically take the same space with Locus and be in a position of overlapping, and it is then reasonable to infer that Locus has its own fixed space that differs from the Locatum (Patrizi 231).
Patrizi also proposed the idea of the vacuum, which is the state that the space is filled with nobodies, contrasting with Locus, which is the state that the Space is filled with bodies (Patrizi 231). For many ancient philosophers including Aristotle, the vacuum does not exist in the world. On the question of whether a vacuum existed in the world, Patrizi analyzed using three scales of empty spaces: are there large empty spaces, small empty spaces, and tiny empty spaces between bodies in the world (Patrizi 232). From the observations on water and air, Patrizi posits that there must be tiny empty spaces between bodies: when two cups of water are combined in one cup, it turns out that the two separate bodies (of water) combined with each other, so there must be tiny spaces that allowed particles of water to fill in (Patrizi 233). Patrizi also noted that the interpenetration of bodies is invalid in explaining this phenomenon because the Locus of two bodies can never be in the state of overlapping (Patrizi 233). Therefore, it could be said that there are empty spaces, which is the Void, between bodies and within bodies. A larger amount of empty space (or vacuum) could also be proven to exist, according to Patrizi, through an example of drawing out air from an enclosed hollow object (Patrizi 234). In fact, this example that Patrizi had mentioned is similar to the modern method of creating a space that is physically defined as a relative vacuum. Since air has been drawn away from the hollow object, then theoretically there should be nothing but empty space (vacuum) inside the hollowed area.
Patrizi additionally stated that Locus, along with empty space, is infinite on the side further from the world (Patrizi 236). He argued that if Locus itself is finite, then there will be no differences between Locus and Locatum, which will be by means identical with finite dimensions; if Locus is bounded, then it could not be bounded by either itself or the world, because the world is unable to bound spaces far away from its boundary, as well as the act of being bounded (passive) and bounding (aggressive) cannot coexist, that Locus can only be bounded or bound others that are not identical to itself (Patrizi 237). Hence, Patrizi determined that Locus, or external space, is infinite and never bounded by anything. But on the other hand, Locus does not come before universal space, and it does not come prior to the vacuum, which is the attribute of universal space (Patrizi 240). Thus we could arrive at the beginning argument that space comes before the world and all other things.
According to Patrizi, space is a substance that “is not composed of matter and form” (Patrizi 241). The universal space included two parts, one filled with the world, and one external space outside the world; if the universal space is in motion, there must be forces exercising by both of the two parts, either acting on one another or obtaining the same amount of power over each other (Patrizi 242). No outside sources can act on the universal space, as Patrizi had noted before, the universal space comes before all other things. Patrizi claimed that the finite (world) and the infinite part of the universal space can’t exercise the same amount of power, and it is also invalid for the two parts to act on each other because they are by means uniform and alike (Patrizi 242). Therefore it could be concluded that the universal space is fixed and no such power exists.
In short, Patrizi proposed that space is the fixed infinite substance that existed prior to all things, and vacuum is the attribute of space. His philosophical reflection on physical space countered and related to ancient philosophical thinkings, which is noteworthy by its influential effect on other philosophers and scientists.
Patrizi, Francesco, and Benjamin Brickman. “On Physical Space.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 4, no. 2, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943, pp. 224–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2707326.
Glossary
- Locus: Place, defined by Aristotle as the surface that enclosed the body.
- Locatum: the space that the body takes in three dimensions, differs from Locus as it is not fixed.
- Three Dimensions: length, width, and depth. The natural property of the body, locus, locatum, and space.
- Vacuum: Void, which is simply empty space with no other substances.