Traditionalist Conservatism
The Right Honorable Edmund Burke, known commonly as the father of modern conservatism, was a staunch defender of traditionalist conservatism, a social and political philosophy which has a great deal of reverence for traditions, customs, natural law ethics, nobility, hierarchies, and religious faith.
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke reacted strongly against a very calamitous time in France which saw King Louis XVI overthrown and beheaded, thousands of other Frenchmen executed, and secular liberal ideas in the ascendance. In order to clear up some confusion among his counter-revolutionary allies, he wrote that “a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.” This is an example of Burke showing that it is necessary to avoid a kind of libertarianism which would prefer to refrain from enforcing moral standards. When there is evil in the world, Burke would respond with those who want to use the power of the state to take action against it, not bless it as a marvel of liberty. For Burke did not confuse liberty with licentiousness. He adhered to the traditional notion of liberty, conceived as consisting in having the right to do what one ought, not in being able to do whatever one wants: “Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should be frequently thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection.” This is a very Pauline attitude concerning the need to curb the passions, and it is no surprise, since Burke always advocated for a public faith: “Religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort.” As a devout Anglican, he was a huge supporter of state-established religion. As a result, Burke was a critic of democracy. He wrote, “Of this, I am certain, that in a democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of polity, as they often must; and that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre.” He shared similar views to Plato in this regard, in that democracy has a tendency to devolve into tyranny. When people become more agnostic about traditional conceptions of the good, other standards are enforced, and society gets farther away from truth and goodness.
This he asked of the revolutionaries: “Do they mean to attaint and disable backwards all the kings that have reigned before the Revolution?” Here, he appeals to the intuitive idea that we ought to have at least some reverence for what our wise forebears thought. He contrasts the French Revolution with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which he considered a just war, precisely because it was made to “preserve [their] ancient, indisputable laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which [was their] only security for law and liberty.” Moreover, he says this: “A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper, and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.” It is clear here that he wants to write in defense of a reverence for antiquity, especially since he does not want people in his day to repeat mistakes made by earlier figures.
His support for this is his advocacy of inductive reasoning: “I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.” To be clear, Burke is not here referring to prejudice in the same way that modern people refer to prejudice. He is not referring to injustice or irrationality, but to the sentiments and instincts of received opinion; he is expressing his animadversion of the modern prejudice against prejudice. Along the same lines, he thought that societies should be seen as having a contract not only among the living, but also with “those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”
He was also a big supporter of the idea of chivalry. He spent several lines describing the greatness and elegance of Marie Antoinette. He concluded as follows: “I thought ten thousand swords must have leapt from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom.” Here, he defends the view that women ought to be treated with a special respect by men, given that they are the weaker sex (e.g., men holding the door open for women). He also is arguing against a kind of economics-crazed conservatism and in favor of a more cultural conservatism, with the idea that fiscal prosperity is something which is likely to follow from a virtuous populace, not the other way around. He wanted people to be philosopher-kings, pursuing Heaven first and foremost, set free by the Truth, but that was tragically not what he observed in the world. In addition, he said that “all the good things which are connected with manners and with civilization … have depended for ages upon two principles; … the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion.” Furthermore, he added, “We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty; and by teaching us a servile, licentious, and abandoned insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of, slavery, through the whole course of our lives.” Herein lies his defense of the common man of natural intuitions and affections. Since man is oriented to Heaven as his ultimate end, practices of humility and avoiding covetousness are to be encouraged.
Source: Burke, Edmund, and Henry Rogers. The Works of Edmund Burke: With a Biographical and Critical Introduction by Henry Rogers. Vol. 1. 2 vols. London: Holdsworth, 1837.
Glossary
- Prejudice – The sentiments and instincts of received opinion, not irrational injustice
- Traditionalist Conservatism – A political philosophy which emphasizes traditions, customs, inductive reasoning, natural law ethics, reverence, religious faith, hierarchies, and nobility
- Licentiousness – A tendency to give into sensual appetites
- Chivalry – A code of courteousness, especially practiced by men towards women