Gaṅgeśa’s Tattva-cintā-maṇi (T.C.) devotes itself to the exploration of four sources of knowledge: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), and sound, or testimony (shabda). In the first volume of the T.C., Gaṅgeśa makes explicit his conception of knowledge and the theory of its acquisition. Unlike in the West, classical Indian philosophy centers on cognition rather than belief as the object of epistemological evaluation, though their concept of cognition is viewed as propositional like belief is in the West.
Gaṅgeśa’s Navya Nyāya (New Nyāya), as well as many other schools of thought, sought to contend with the issue of how proposition-laden cognition can be known to be true or false. In his system, Anubhava, or an awareness/ experience taken to mean that what a person accepts as a presentation of new information, is presumed to be knowledge, but can be on occasion false or not produced by a genuine source of knowledge. Gaṅgeśa advances an “extrinsicality” position. And although presumptive presentations of “fresh news” through any of the sources are naturally and automatically taken to be true, he believes that further cognitive action is required to certify whether a cognition is knowledge or “non-knowledge.” Such certification happens through inferential source identification, either from indicative signs of genuine sources called “merits,” guṇa, or recognizing signs of pseudo-sources called “flaws,” doṣa (Upādhyāya et al., 1888).
According to his Mīmāṃsā interlocutors, the certification of a cognition is intrinsic to its perceived presentation. Still, Gaṅgeśa does not accept this account based on the dependence of doubt/ knowing that one knows based on one’s unique consciousness and lived experiences. He says that if the Mīmāṃsaka position were correct, it would be impossible to doubt the truth of things like perceptions that are true instances of knowledge produced through genuine sources of knowledge, which is false. Gaṅgeśa argues that the processes of pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, and shabda generate anubhava and that no false awarenesses are produced from the sources, but there are occasions when we may be fooled. He introduces the idea that there are pseudo-sources, which closely resemble the true ones, but are flawed in some way and generate false cognitions. Additionally, there are instances of apramā, awarenesses that we take to be telling us something true in the usual fashions, but are actually false or not produced correctly. He contrasts this with pramā, a concept entailing truth and right production.
Gaṅgeśa also says that pragmatic considerations reinforce our natural tendency to take the notions delivered by the four sources to be truthful. Essentially, we wouldn’t be able to function in the world without some sort of knowledge. And this idea is also a recurrent theme in his work, as Gaṅgeśa relies on “pragmatic contradiction” to refute skepticism about inference (Uphadyaya, 1888, p. 647–651). He argues that when one has doubt there is no regular pattern to their behavior, and when there is a regular pattern, such doubt does not occur. He argues that it is incoherent for someone to perform an action in order to achieve some consequence and then doubt that the action is what causes it. Thus, we may reject the argument that virodha, which governs what F cannot occur along with some G, cannot block an infinite regress. For it is the doubter’s own behavior that proves the nonexistence of the doubt, which blocks it (pratibandhaka).
The Nyāya doctrine readily accepts the idea of fallibilism, as such, Gaṅgeśa’s theory of knowledge possesses a defeasibility character that centers on the fact that perceptibly trustworthy sources of information at times mislead. In response to skepticism about the veracity of anumana based on the potential of future conflicting knowledge, he contends that it may be true that repeated observation (“even hundreds of times”) is insufficient to guarantee knowledge of the natural entailments on which anumana depends. However, though Gaṅgeśa admits that the possibility of a counterexample to one’s knowledge cannot be eliminated, he asserts that most meaningful doubt can be done away with through it. He maintains that absolute freedom from doubt is not required to have knowledge. Knowledge guides action, and even if it may be wrong in any particular case, we regularly act on the basis of the observable certainties of nature, automatically making inferences and producing knowledge. (Nath & Uphadyaya, 1897, p. 20-22)
In these cases of false knowledge, it is not actually the knowledge sources at work, but rather imitations of them. Knowledge sources (pramāṇa) themselves are inerrant and are able to be certified. But even though it is accepted that awareness is naturally taken to be informative, this presumption can be blocked by a defeater of a source of knowledge. When regarding the other three sources, in the case that we are aware of a blocker for one of the sources, like a speaker being a liar for shabda, we don’t actually take ourselves to be presented with anubhava. These awarenesses are not triggered when blocked. Gaṅgeśa claims that defeat and certification belong to a higher level of cognition where we are self-conscious about justification, rather than knowledge being self-evident like for the Mīmāṃsāka (Upādhyāya et al., 1888). And because we also give the benefit of the doubt, bādhakam vinā, “unless there is a defeater.” we avoid an epistemic regress as proposed by Western skeptics.
In the larger debate on certification, Gaṅgeśa focuses mainly on the arguments of Prābhākaras in Mīmāṃsā. In order to secure the authority of Vedic testimony for rituals and various rules of everyday life effortlessly, Mīmāṃsakas maintain that knowledge is self-certifying, meaning that the consciousness of knowledge and the consciousness of its validity both come from the same place (Nath & Uphadyaya, 1897, p. 10). Less concerned by this aim, Gaṅgeśa focuses on perceptual knowledge, which in certain circumstances can both be doubted and/ or later certified as knowledge. Certification comes by way of inference, determining that an awareness-generating process is a factively conceived perception. There are also different signs whereby one knows that an instance of inferential knowledge is both true and produced in the right way. For testimony, certification conditions are the speaker’s being a trustworthy expert along with conditions governing what it is to be a proper statement and of course certain hearer conditions (such as knowing the language). In some cases, Gaṅgeśa admits self-certification, but the believes Mīmāṃsakas are wrong to take that to be the general rule.
Glossary:
Pratyakṣa– Perception
Anumāna– Inference
Upamāna– Comparison
Śabda– Sound, or testimony.
Anubhava- Awareness or “experience,” defined as what a person takes to be a presentation of news.
Apramā- Non-knowledge
Pramā– Knowledge
Virodha- Natural opposition, contradiction
Pratibandhaka- An obstacle or impediment.
Pramāṇâbhāsa- What makes the concept of the apparent knowledge source central bādhakam vinā, “unless there is a defeater.”
Guṇa– Merits
Doṣa- Flaws
References:
Nath, T. & Upādhyāya, Gaṅgeśa.(1897, January 1). The tattva-chintamani vol,1 : Tarkavagisa Mathura Nath : Free download, borrow, and streaming. Internet Archive. Retrieved November 1, 2022, from https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.545885/page/11/mode/2up
Phillips, S. (2020, June 18). Gaṅgeśa. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved November 1, 2022, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gangesa/
Upādhyāya Gaṅgeśa, Tarkavāgīśa Kāmākhyānātha, Tarkavāgīśa Mathurānātha, Miśra Jayadeva, & Vidyāvāgīśa Kr̥ṣṇakānta. (1888). The tattva-chintámaṇi. Baptist Mission Press.