Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Bayle fall on two opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the objectivity of morality. Hobbes contends that morality is objective and can be determined rationally. Bayle, on the other hand, argues that moral knowledge cannot be attained through reason or observation. Pragmatically, this also causes them to diverge in their political philosophy, with Hobbes arguing for a strong central authority and Bayle claiming that that is not the role of the state.
It is important to consider the context that each philosopher existed within to understand the source of their perspectives. Hobbes wrote his most famous work, Leviathan, under the veil of the English Civil War. He sympathized with the Royalist cause and detested the Parliamentarians, strengthening his view of state power as a mechanism to fight immorality and corruption. This experience may also have resulted in his more grounded, black and white view of morality. Bayle, however, wrote his most comprehensive work, the Historical and Critical Dictionary, following a lifetime of persecution as a Huguenot in Catholic France. This, particularly the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, caused him to question how the State, guided by the light of reason, could act so immorally. He ultimately contended that one must look directly to God to make a definite moral judgement.
Despite their polar-opposite conclusions, both philosophers build the framework of their argumentation at the same source: history. Hobbes begins in prehistory with humanity in the state of nature. He claims that it is an unpreferred state, one that is constantly in war. It, however, is where Hobbes derives natural law, the basis for his objective moral philosophy. The natural state is where humans show their innate desires and behaviors, allowing him to construct arguments about humanity. For instance, peace and security is a good, desired state; therefore, actions taken in furtherance of mutual peace and security are good. These conclusions drawn directly from observations of the state of nature make up natural law, which Hobbes describes as eternally unchanging and rigid.
Bayle does not go far back into prehistory, instead opting to observe the world around him. He sees the French monarchy oppressing Huguenots, Jews, and others to spread its perceived orthodox. To Bayle, this and other oppression occurring throughout Europe, is both ethically and logically absurd. He asserts that reason leading to obviously morally incorrect action is a symptom of reason’s unreliability. He accepts Descartes’ First and Second Meditations, rejecting the rest; observation and logic are insufficient to support an objective claim. He never goes so far as to say that reason is verifiably false, but critiques its use in many moral and practical applications. In these instances, Bayle typically claims that God and his word would be better used by decisionmakers.
Both philosophers’ moral frameworks lead to very different political philosophies. Hobbes derives his political philosophy from natural law. To promote human interest like peace and security, laid out as laws of nature, states are necessary. Thus, states gain legitimacy by providing peace and security. Once the State loses its ability to do so, it loses its legitimacy. Hobbes’ ideal state—one that is able to best maintain peace and security—would have power as concentrated as possible in the hands of an absolutist leader, preventing the disagreement of bodies from triggering a social and political fallout. This state also has the authority to make any law, insofar as it continues to uphold its obligation. For Hobbes, morality starts and ends with the state. Morals are derived from basic desires of the people for peace and security, which the State may take any action to uphold. Although Hobbes was publicly Christian, the obligation of the State to the people and the obligation of the people to the state can be seen as the only two moral considerations in society.
Unlike his underlying moral philosophy, its political ramifications do not fall opposite to Hobbes. He is not an anarchist—in fact, he writes very little if at all about his ideal society—and can be seen as more of a political moderate. Relying on direct interpretations of scripture, which overcome reason, Bayle finds that mental actions, which definitely exist, matter, whereas physical actions, which are questionable, are of little importance. Thus, somebody acting in a way they perceive as moral, even if the action runs contrary to objective morality, is acting morally. Bayle does not go deep into the societal ramifications of this, and his critics have claimed that this opens the door for the State having no mandate to control behavior. Others argue that this extrapolation is too limited; the State can still deliver reasonable punishments to those acting in a way they know is immoral—Bayle may argue that anyone committing a heinous crime must know they are acting immorally as the light of God, even perceived incorrectly, cannot lead one so astray. It can also use non-coercive tools like education to bring those of moral mind closer to the objective moral standard.
Influenced by their unique positions in space and time, Hobbes and Bayle drew two fundamentally different conclusions about morality. Hobbes laid out a clear system based on natural law, and Bayle constructed his outside the bounds of reason, if he even created one at all. They both looked to history but drew from different times. The natural state was simple and conducive for drawing definite conclusions, but 1600s Europe was messy and full of contradiction, lending itself to doubt. Ultimately, Hobbes’ moral framework led him to construct an ideal societal structure based around a powerful protector-state. Bayle did not have a cohesive vision for society, but his view of mental actions as supreme over physical actions in the eyes of God gave the state less room to exercise power. Analyzing these two philosophers together, paints a picture of how small differences in philosophical practice like choosing where to first look can result in fundamentally different views of reality.