References
Secondary:
Beaulieu, J. (2021). Gaṅgeśa on absence in retrospect. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49(4), 603–639. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09477-y
In this article, Beaulieu examines Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology of past absence, meaning that from inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) an object or property, agents find that the recollectable (smaraṇârha) object or property was absent. He draws the distinction between two groups of views about the epistemology of past absence: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information, and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. He then reconstructs a Bhāṭṭa and a competing Nyāya argument well as the Śālikanātha and Sucarita’s critiques of recollection views, then dives into Gaṅgeśa’s critiques of the Bhāṭṭa account and the recollection failure view he constructs out of its shortcomings.
Das, N. (2021). Gaṅgeśa on epistemic luck. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49(2), 153–202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09461-6
Das’s essay explores the problem that the notion of pramā, conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something, generates for Nyāya epistemologists. Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event just in case it is true and non-recollective as well as what Das calls Nyāya Infallibilism, which is the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. In cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent accidentally arrives at a true judgement, these seem to conflict, however, Das goes on to show that Gaṅgeśa solves this problem by adopting the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in knowledge production.
Phillips, S. H. (2015). A defeasibility theory of knowledge in Gaṅgeśa. Oxford Handbooks Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199314621.013.32
In this article, Phillips investigates the organizing idea explored in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattva-cintā-maṇi- the “knowledge source,” pramāṇa. The four proposed pramāṇa are perception, inference, analogy, and testimony, and commonly the argumentation of claims centers on these as generators of true beliefs as opposed to imitators (pramāṇa-ābhāsa) that generate false beliefs or true beliefs in the wrong way. Philips argues that Gaṅgeśa’s theory of knowledge draws attention to including fallacies such as “pseudo-provers” (hetv-ābhāsa) and “inferential undercutters” (upādhi).
Primary:
Upādhyāya, G., Bhattacharya, J. V., & Śiromaṇi R. (1872). The Tattva-chintamani. Nūtana Saṁskṛta Yantre Mudritah.