Adam Smith and David Hume are two highly influential intellectuals from the Scottish Enlightenment. The former is best known for The Wealth of Nations, commonly regarded as the first major writing in modern economics. The latter is commonly regarded as one of history’s greatest philosophers, contributing to a variety of areas. While Hume made contributions to economic thought, writing in support of free trade decades before Smith, the greatest overlap between the two is in their work on moral philosophy. Smith’s ideas on moral philosophy are detailed in his A Theory of Moral Sentiments, published as a summary of the lectures he gave at University of Glasgow, where he was the chair of moral philosophy (Heilbroner, Henderson). In addition to being intellectual contemporaries, Smith and Hume were long time friends, first meeting in Edinburgh, prior to Smith receiving a position at Glasgow, and maintaining their relationship until Hume’s death in 1776, with the last letter sent from Hume to Smith being three days before his death, written by Hume’s nephew while he was unable to rise from his bed (Smith). Their close friendship was rather unconventional; Smith was a well respected faculty member and Hume, who was 12 years his senior, was too radical to be accepted into that community (Rasmussen). As they lived most of their lives at a significant distance from each other, they communicated frequently through letters, many detailing their philosophical theories. As a result of these communications, each certainly had an influence on the perspectives of the other. Though the contents of Smith’s work reflect this influence from Hume, the two were certainly not in perfect agreement.
The idea of sympathy is central in both of their works. Hume goes as far as to say “no quality of human nature is more remarkable…than the propensity we have to sympathize with others” (Hume 166). To similar effect, Smith argues that our ability to sympathize with the dead “guards and protects the society” (Smith 8). While they are in agreement about its importance, the pair disagree on its root. In Hume’s theory, one person observes a joyous friend and is directly brightened by the sight. Similarly, should the same person see someone angry or sad, that person will inherit these emotions to some degree. Smith takes a slightly more subtle approach to sympathy. He is of the opinion that our imagination is the key contributor to sympathy. When we see someone struggling, we put ourselves in their shoes and imagine what it would be like. Again using the example of the dead, Smith points out that we cannot sympathize with them based on their emotions, as they have none. Hence, it must be our imagination that allows us to pity their circumstances.
One of the ideas at the core of Smith’s moral philosophy is the “impartial spectator.” He describes it as an unbiased conscience that resides within a person and should be that person’s moral judge. While Hume believes in a similar spectator, there are again subtle differences in between each philosopher’s conception. The major distinction is the origin of the spectator. Smith’s “impartial spectator” grows from “continual observation of others,” which “lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.” (Smith 140). Thus, it is not innate in each person. Instead, it is learned throughout life and can be heavily influenced by the society one grows up in. Hume, on the other hand, believes that people are born with “a natural disposition to care about the good of their society” (Sayre-McCord). Hence, they have a more natural ability to judge the morality of their actions, as they concern those around them. These ideas are difficult to reconcile. Smith’s view is much less ideal than Hume’s. In the world Smith imagines, someone growing up in a morally corrupt society will have no ability to escape because they learn their “impartial” moral reasoning from a very partial group of people. In contrast, any individual in Hume’s world would have the innate ability to overcome the moral corruption of those around them. While Smith’s world may not give much hope for moral improvement, Hume’s does not seem to paint a bright picture either; Hume’s theory would suggest that morally corrupt people have an innate ability to understand their errors, but choose not to use it.
On the whole, Smith and Hume had similar views. They focused their moral philosophy on sympathy, with a strong distaste towards the reduction of morality to simple rules; they both believed morality was too nuanced to be described in such a way. Further, neither strived to apply their concepts of morality to concrete situations. The pair believed that moral decisions had to be made in each situation by the person in that situation based on their unbiased conscience. Despite these and many other similarities, Smith’s and Hume’s theories differed enough for them both to be incredibly unique and essential contributions to moral philosophy.
Bibliography:
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Henderson, David R. “David Hume.” Econlib, 17 Aug. 2022, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Hume.html.
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McNeil, Taylor. “An Enlightened Friendship.” Tufts Now, 16 Jan. 2018, https://now.tufts.edu/2018/01/16/enlightened-friendship.
Rasmussen, Dennis C.. The Infidel and the Professor : David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought / Dennis C. Rasmussen. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017. Print.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. “Hume and Smith on Sympathy, Approbation, and Moral Judgment.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 12 Feb. 2014, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/hume-and-smith-on-sympathy-approbation-and-moral-judgment/4B3C671E5A7E968E55DA38ED6288865F.
Smith, Adam. “The Death of David Hume.” Received by William Strachan, 9 Nov. 1776, Kirkaldy.
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