Although he may be best known for The Wealth of Nations, a foundational work in economic literature, Adam Smith made significant contributions to moral philosophy. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, he constructs a unique and detailed theory of human motivation and morality (Heilbroner). While this work contains many interesting claims concerning human psychology, Smith’s “impartial spectator” is chief among them. Briefly described, the “impartial spectator” within each person is meant to provide them an unbiased assessment of how they would feel in someone else’s situation. Smith argues that people morally due to the presence of their “impartial spectator.”
Smith’s idea of sympathy was based on imagining oneself in another’s position, in contrast to many of his contemporaries, who believed that sympathy should simply be a function of the actual feelings of others (Fleischacker). This conception allows for people to pass judgment on and determine the legitimacy of someone else’s feelings. This necessitates that “impartial spectator” must be free of personal bias, but understanding of human emotion. The following question arises naturally: how is each person meant to form this unbiased, yet emotional perspective? Smith claims that it is developed through one’s “continual observation of others,” which “lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.” (Smith 140). This, however, must be an incomplete account of the formation of the “impartial spectator.” For surely one’s own self interest, and thus their biases, has a substantial impact on their analysis of the actions of others. To compensate for this, Smith adds one must not be certain that they have not judged someone fairly unless, “other people view them in the same light” (Smith 140). It is clear here that the construction of the “impartial spectator” relies heavily on societal norms. Some argue that this is a great weakness of Smith’s theory (Fleischaker). One’s “impartial spectator” fails to be impartial if it is affected by the bias of the surrounding society. However, some point earlier in the text to support the idea that the impartial spectator is universal, “We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” (Smith 99, Fleischaker). From this, it is clear that Smith intended for the “impartial spectator” to escape social biases, but it is unclear how he believes it could do so. If it is developed based on observation of one’s surroundings, then it is contradictory to believe that the “impartial spectator” could be in substantial disagreement with the bias of the society in which it is placed.
While the possibility of its existence is an important topic, Smith’s argument for the necessity of the “impartial spectator” is arguably more central to his theory. The former shows the feasibility of his thoughts, but it is of trivial importance if Smith cannot demonstrate that the “impartial spectator” is essential to morality. One of his arguments for it hinges on the following idea: humans are naturally apathetic towards each other. To illustrate this, he describes a typical reaction one might have to a terrible natural disaster halfway across the globe. He acknowledges that any person would act instantly concerned for those affected directly and indirectly, but then Smith claims that “after human sentiments had been fairly expressed, …[they] would pursue [their] business…with the same ease and tranquility, as if nothing had happened” (Smith 120). After describing such a mundane reaction to a terrible disaster, Smith argues that most people would be much more distressed by a relatively minor inconvenience in their life. To show the need for the impartial spectator, Smith poses the following question: “To prevent…this paltry misfortune, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred million of his brethren, provided he had never seen them?” (Smith 120). The resounding answer to this question is no. But, if people are apathetic towards the misfortunes of others, then why would they inflict them on others for their own personal gain? Smith’s answer, the “impartial spectator”, is perhaps a bit predictable at this point. His supporting argument hinges on the claim that no purely emotional motive could prevent a person from acting in their own self interest, and thus there must be a deeper, more logical reason. Smith argues that it is the conscience of the person, taught over time and through observation to resent harmful actions, that makes it utterly impossible to commit such a selfish act as harming others for personal gain. He concludes this argument with the claim, “self-love can only be corrected by the eye of this impartial spectator” (Smith 120). This argument is, to use a graders favorite phrase while reading mathematical proofs, missing steps. Smith fails to demonstrate why it cannot be benevolence, or even some miniscule level of acknowledgement of the value of human life, that prevents a person from slaughtering millions of people for slight personal gain. One who believes this takes a very dismal view of humanity; they must believe it is only through a person’s logical assessment of the actions of people around them that they determine it is wrong to commit such an evil, selfish act. Now, it is not only difficult to see how the “impartial spectator” can be created, for there is also reason to doubt Smith’s justification of its importance.
Despite the critical view of Smith’s ideas outlined above, he certainly has support on these topics. Furthermore, many ideas in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that outline human motivations are used later in his groundbreaking book, The Wealth of Nations. One of these ideas, that people are driven to be loved and admired by their peers, is quite compelling (Heilbroner). Assuming this is true, it is not hard to explain why people are so focused on success and why they would want to act morally. So, while Smith failed to make a convincing argument for his thesis in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he began forming ideas that laid the foundation for his future work.
Key Terms:
Impartial Spectator – An internal conscience that is meant to provide one an objective idea of how they would feel in someone else’s situation
Sources:
Fleischacker, Samuel. “Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 15 Feb. 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/smith-moral-political/#Bib.
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. MetaLibri, 2006, ibiblio, https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_MoralSentiments_p.pdf, Accessed 12 Oct. 2022.
Robert, Heilbroner. “The Theory of Moral Sentiments of Adam Smith.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1999, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adam-Smith/The-Theory-of-Moral-Sentiments.