A recurring at-issue question in philosophy of mind and philosophy of education is that of nature versus nurture. Which aspects of a person are formed through experience and circumstance, and which are fixed from birth or predisposed by the human condition has widespread implications, including in the end goals of educational processes, and accountability for a person’s actions. Though Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy were written as a commentary on Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, her views on education bear resemblance to those expressed by John Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and it is with Locke that her views will be contrasted here.
Locke states that “great care is to be had in the forming of Children’s Minds, and giving them Seasoning early, which shall influence their Lives always after,” a clear indication that he belongs in the nurturist camp. (§32) This conviction is not absolute, however, and he does acknowledge the existence of an innate nature: “God has stamp’d certain Characters upon Men’s Minds, which like their Shapes, may perhaps be a little mended, but can hardly be totally altere’d and transform’d into the contrary.” (§66) Taken together, these passages paint a picture of education as an ameliorative endeavor, taking the underlying inclinations of a child’s mind, and “seasoning” it with knowledge and ideas so as to develop it. The innate attributes of a child’s mind do not determine with specificity the person that emerges from the educational process, and instead impose a broad limit on what outcomes are possible to achieve through education.
Grouchy is a more ardent nurturist, and nowhere acknowledges any sort of limiting natural inclinations. Her account of human moral reasoning stems entirely from faculties of sensitivity and reflection. In short, by reflecting on past pleasurable and painful experiences, and observing the experiences of others, people develop an understanding as to the pain and pleasure that their actions will cause. (Letter II) Per Grouchy, education should “exercise children’s sensitivity to the point where it will continue to develop… so that it can no longer be dulled by the things in life that lead sensitivity astray.” (Letter I) Similarly to Locke, she emphasizes the lasting impact of childhood education on a person, but added is the implication that absent this education, a person may be subject to formative influences beyond childhood. Were a child’s sensitivity not appropriately developed, it might be “led astray” later on. By contrast, Locke states that ideas about foundational moral principles “are perhaps not as easily let into the Minds of grown Men.” (§81)
Common to Grouchy and Locke is the notion that in addition to just developing a child’s knowledge and reasoning skills, education must also develop moral virtues. Grouchy’s thoughts on moral education stem directly from her theories as to how an understanding of good and evil is formed. As discussed earlier, Grouchy postulates a mechanism reliant upon an understanding of pains and pleasures in other people. Consequently, she proposes that we should “cultivate in children’s their natural sensitivity to other people’s pleasures, and especially the happiness they derive from contributing to it.” (Letter III), thus equipping a child with sufficiently strong sympathy so as to be able to develop good moral tendencies. Under Grouchy’s theory, an understanding of moral good and evil, and a tendency towards moral good, arises when specific instances of sympathy are understood collectively, and kinds of actions are recognized in the abstract as having typically positive or negative effects. As with the development of sympathy, Grouchy believes education should facilitate this step of abstraction: “It is therefore desirable that one of the main objects of education be to provide some ease in acquiring general ideas and experiencing those abstract general sentiments…” (Letter V)
Grouchy, through the framework of her theory of morality, is able to break down the educational goal of developing moral virtue into two more specific objectives: cultivating sympathy, and facilitating the generalization and abstraction of sympathy. However, she does not specify the manner in which these outcomes are to be achieved. Locke, by contrast, gives significant attention to how children learn ideas of right and wrong. Though he does not build from a systematization of moral good and evil, his specific examples of what is to be encouraged and discouraged align reasonably well with Grouchy’s. It should be noted here that Locke’s writing predates Grouchy, and if any similarity between their writings is due to influence, it would have been Locke who influenced Grouchy, rather than the other way around.
Locke specifically places great credence in children’s impressionability, and the power of examples set by adults to influence the minds of children. This is presented both as a danger and as a tool. Locke cautions that glorifying conquerors “who for the most part are the great Butchers of mankind” warps children’s values, causing them “to think Slaughter the laudable Business of Mankind, and the most heroick of Virtues.” (§116) Children, he believes, are apt to adopt the values they see expressed by those around them, believing them to be right. This same impressionability, Locke argues, is a powerful tool for education in and of itself. By reasoning with children, and providing explanations for what they are told to do, children learn the importance of respecting others as rational persons. (§81)
Both Grouchy and Locke recognized that education was a powerful, formative tool. They understood that the educational experiences one received in childhood would shape them as a person, and could set them on a path to a morally virtuous life. Grouchy, however, takes a step that Locke does not, and acknowledges the responsibility that is a product of this paradigm. “Let us not be surprised that we should know so little of the general laws of nature. How many times in one century does education succeed in giving a mind the necessary strength and rectitude to form abstract ideas?” (Letter V) Grouchy recognizes that if education has the power to shape people, then the types of individuals who inhabit a society are not of their respective natures by mere happenstance, but as a direct consequence of that society’s educational decisions. With the power to shape human lives, education comes with the responsibility to do so for the better.
Additional Works Cited
- Locke, John, 1632-1704, and Robert Hebert Quick. Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Cambridge University press, 1895.