The political revolutions that came to define the western world during the late 18th century were founded on a rapidly developing landscape of political and moral philosophy. As the foundations of government were being explored and re-examined, the natural disposition of people (the constituents and subjects of government) became of prime importance. One view, expressed most famously by Thomas Hobbes, is that people are fundamentally selfish in nature, and are predisposed to act badly if it serves their interests. By contrast, Sophie de Grouchy adopts the position that people are predisposed to act virtuously and do moral good. This disposition is not one innately ingrained in the mind from conception; rather, it is developed and reinforced, or suppressed and overridden through upbringing, education, and social institutions
Grouchy observes that people are born into a state of complete and total dependence on others for their needs to be met. From the moment a child is born, this dependence creates sentiments towards other people. Reliance on a breastfeeding mother or nurse, she states, leads an infant to “experience her first sensations of pleasure,” and develop a positive association with the one providing that experience. (70, Letter II) Humans form memories of past sensations and experiences, which include whether they were painful or pleasurable. It is through a faculty of reflection that people are able to recall past experiences along with the pain or pleasure that accompanied them. (Grouchy 68, Letter II) Reflection forms the initial mechanism of sympathy; another’s experience of a sensation or sentiment brings to mind a person’s own experiences of that sentiment, causing them to feel similarly.
Importantly, the sentiments felt through sympathy mirror those of the person being sympathized with. Pleasure of others causes one to experience pleasure themself, and thus pleasure is derived from doing good towards others. (Grouchy 105-106, Letter V) This sympathetic pleasure gives rise to a sentiment Grouchy terms “the satisfaction of having done good,” and the negative dual sentiment of remorse. (106-107)
Grouchy’s definitions of moral virtue – “actions that give others pleasure in a way that is sanctioned by reason,” and moral evil – “an act that is harmful to others and which is prohibited by reason,” at first glance appear utilitarian, but she is quick to distance herself from the position that “moral good and evil refer to whatever is more useful or harmful to humanity in general.” (110-111, letter V) Humans are not capable of considering universal good and evil and must instead turn inward to their sympathies, weighing the relative satisfaction or remorse an action might bring. Moreover people eventually become accustomed to assessing moral good and evil, and no longer need to evaluate or reflect with specificity. (111-112) Grouchy’s moral good and evil are rooted in effects that actions have on others, but comprehension of good and evil arises from sympathy and sentiment, as does a desire to take actions that are good and avoid those that are evil.
Having postulated that human development naturally creates both an understanding of good and evil as well as an impulse to do good, Grouchy is forced to confront the fact that in reality, people do not always behave virtuously, and sometimes take actions that are evil. Grouchy postulates that people do evil when they have some motivation that overcomes their desire to do good. Specifically, she specifies four such motivations: love, monetary interest, ambition for power or influence, and personal vanity. She is quick to specify, though, that vanity is “often the cause and the aim” of desire for ambition and money. (133, Letter VII) For each of these reasons, she finds a cause external to the person committing the wrongdoing, hence these reasons fail to negate the natural goodness of humans. These causes are wealth inequality, unjust laws and their unfair application to people, and social institutions.
Regarding wealth inequality, Grouchy considers a scenario in which the wealth of France is redistributed among the populous, not perfectly equitably, but with the upper class retaining three quarters of wealth, with the average family owning their even share of the one quarter that remains. In this scenario, she contends, a family owns enough land and resources to make a comfortable and secure living. (134, Letter VII) Living by honest means, individuals would no longer be reduced to unvirtuous behavior to provide for themselves. Wealth inequality also threatened sympathy within a society, and Grouchy wished to remove inequality that “puts the poor too far from the rich to be known by them, and the rich too far from the poor to see them.” (150-151, Letter VIII) If the uppermost and lowermost classes of society were more humanized in each other’s eyes, they would be less inclined to steal, defraud, and exploit.
According to Grouchy, unfair application of rule of law was much to blame for enabling financial wrongdoing and creating the conditions of wealth inequality. In her view, laws “ought to supplement citizens’ conscience.” (136, Letter VII) A system of laws in which the powerful could slip through loopholes, or have either wrongdoing overlooked enables unjust wealth accumulation by the already wealthy. Instead, laws should be applied so as to foster regret for unjust actions, thereby creating a sentimental disincentive. (135-136)
She stresses, though, that the strongest incentive is not that created by harsh punishment, but by proportional and measured punishment, and states that a sentence’s “justice must be perceptible to average reason.” (147, Letter VIII) Were a sentence disproportionately harsh, it would inspire public sympathy for the victim and animosity for the judicial system that dealt the sentence, thereby undermining the deterrent power of the law. Should unjust sentences be imposed, or the rich treated differently under the law than the poor, laws will “no longer inform [a person’s] conscience, because they outrage their reason.” (147)
Immoralities of vanity, as well as those of lust stem not from the law but from other social institutions. These institutions cause people to “grant exaggerated worth to frivolous traits.” (137, Letter VII) These ‘frivolous traits’ are ‘non-personal qualities,’ such as wealth, power, and superiority of wit. Ambition is sparked when one regards these qualities as valuable and seeks to attain them. Their ambition is legitimized by others valuing the qualities the ambitions person has attained. (137-138)
Regarding moral evil motivated by love, Grouchy clarifies that she means not a caring, compassionate love, but something more akin to lust. If love is mutual, caring, and compassionate, then people conduct themselves virtuously. Instead, she contends, “injustice can only be motivated here by the desire to possess, or to have possessed this or that woman.” (139, Letter VII) In one of the few passages in the letters that specifically mentions women as a distinct social group, Grouchy describes the injustice of objectification. Men are driven to wrongdoing by regarding women as objects to be possessed, rather than people to be sympathized with.
Surrounded by a world of inequality, objectification, and disregard for human well-being, Grouchy nonetheless adopts a philosophy of hope and possibility. If people are shaped by their surroundings, then there is a possibility to change their behavior through modifying social and legal institutions. If the circumstances of human upbringing naturally develop a tendency towards moral good, then perhaps they are capable of running a society that treats its citizens well. This was no doubt on Grouchy’s mind as she advocated for the institution of a French republic.
Glossary
- Moral sympathy: Sympathy with regards to moral pains and pleasures
- Moral pains and pleasures: Pains and pleasures that are of a social, personal, or otherwise non-physical nature.
- Physical pains and pleasures: Those pains and pleasures that result from bodily sensation or harm.
- Reflection: The human faculty to recall memory of past experiences, as well as their accompanying sentiments
- Sentiment: A positive or negative value associated with an experience
- Sympathy: “Sympathy is the disposition we have to feel in a way similar to others.” (Grouchy 59, Letter II)