Although Sophie de Grouchy was an active participant in French intellectualism throughout the later 18th century, she only ever published one book in her own name: The Letters on Sympathy (French: Les Lettres sur la Sympathie). Published in 1798, these eight letters accompanied Grouchy’s translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The Letters on Sympathy provide significant critiques of Smith’s theories on moral sentiments and sympathy, and they provide detailed analyses and theories of the origins of sympathy and its relationship to institutional arrangements. Given that The Letters on Sympathy is the only known published work in her own name, Grouchy’s views on the origins of sympathy are among her most significant and most interesting contributions to philosophy.
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith posits that moral views and judgements can be acquired from sympathy and that the rational abilities of humans must be developed in order to make sympathy useful. Here, Grouchy agrees with Smith. However, her biggest issue with Smith’s views is that he does not provide an account of the origins of sympathy in order to sufficiently understand what sympathy is – Smith merely declared sympathy as a human disposition, not what it is and where it comes from. According to Grouchy, “I was sorry that he did not venture to trace it back, getting through to its first cause and finally showing how sympathy must belong to every being capable of feeling and thinking” (Grouchy, 1). In other words, in order to truly understand sympathy, we must understand its origins. This is the task that Grouchy sets out to accomplish in The Letters on Sympathy: to identify and provide a complete account of the origins of sympathy. Furthermore, Grouchy adds that the origins of sympathy must be universal; since sympathy is present in all human societies, the explanation for its first cause must be something that can be easily applied to all humans, regardless of where they are born. As such, Grouchy’s views on sympathy depart from previous philosophies, including those of Adam Smith.
To start, Grouchy distinguishes between sympathy resulting from moral evils and sympathy resulting from physical evils. According to Grouchy, all physical pain produces a compound sensation in the sufferer: a localized pain in the body part affected and an accompanying impression of pain that can continue to exist without the localized pain. This painful impression can be recalled through later recollection of the impression, even when the localized, physical pain has long since disappeared. Given this, Grouchy concludes that our sympathy for physical pains originates from the compound sensation that pain produces within us, “a part of which can be revived simply by the idea of pain” (Grouchy, 2). In other words, we have sympathy for physical pain because we can easily recall what it is like to personally experience it. Grouchy assigns the same reasoning to impressions of pleasure: much like pain, we can have sympathy towards the physical pleasures of others. However, Grouchy notes that sympathy towards pleasure is harder to experience and rarer than sympathy towards pain because pleasure is less intense than pain. Therefore, the impression of pleasure is harder to arouse. Grouchy concludes the first letter with her assertion that “the root causes of sympathy come from the nature of the sensations that pleasure and pain make us have, and that our status as beings who feel is what basically makes us capable of sympathy…” (Grouchy, 4). As such, Grouchy identifies the origins of sympathy as a result of impressions caused by pleasure and pain. However, this is not yet a complete account of the origins of sympathy; the origins of physical sympathy have been established, not the origins of moral sympathy.
Having established that sensations of pain and pleasure eventually give rise to sentiments of sympathy, Grouchy turns her attention to identifying a physical trigger that is responsible for causing these sensations of pain and pleasure. This physical trigger is responsible for bridging the gap between physical sympathy and moral sympathy; it explains how the former leads to the formation of the latter. In order to identify this trigger, Grouchy specifies that it must be something that is common to all human beings, since the presence of sympathy is observed in all human societies. Therefore, this physical trigger must be a mechanism that is consistent across all cultural and societal barriers.
Grouchy traces the first cause of sympathy to infant-hood. According to her, the formation of human bonds is integral to cultivating sympathy. Grouchy argues that these first human bonds originate from the physical relationship between a baby and its nurse. The baby is wholly dependent on its nurse for survival. Through the nurse, the baby is fed and has its most basic needs taken care of. The sensations of pleasure and pain that the baby experiences as a result of the nurse’s care are entirely in relation to the presence or absence of the nurse. Therefore, the development of sympathy occurs through sensations of pleasure and pain that are entirely dependent on the presence of another human being. In this way, babies begin to form human bonds and relational attachments that necessitate the presence of others for the experiences of pleasure and pain. As humans develop, these primal sensations become more complex and attached to abstract objects. Consequently, these sentiments of physical sympathy develop into morality and moral sympathy. As such, Grouchy identifies this physical trigger (the discovery of pain and pleasure sensations through nursing) as the origin of sympathy.
As established above, Grouchy’s account – that sympathy originates in infant-hood and arises out of physical sensations of pleasure and pain through nursing – provides a naturalistic explanation to the origins of sympathy. Unlike Adam Smith, who merely identifies sympathy as a human disposition, Grouchy investigates the role of physiology in behavior and the development of morality. In this way, Grouchy’s views on the origins of sympathy are philosophically significant.
Glossary:
account: a theory. An explanation in terms of the underlying metaphysical elements
first cause: a supposed cause of all events. In this case, the supposed cause of sympathy
impression: perceptions, involving actual sensation, that the mind experiences strongly and vividly
sentiment: refers to “feeling”
Bibliography
Grouchy, Sophie. (1798). Les Lettres sur la Sympathie.
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