William Godwin was one of the most radical political voices of the late Enlightenment. In An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), he proposed that human beings are indefinitely perfectible, that is, capable of limitless moral and intellectual improvement through the exercise of reason. The doctrine of perfectibility is at the center of Godwin’s philosophy, linking his determinism, ethics of rational benevolence, and his anarchist critique of coercive institutions. In this essay, I explain what Godwin means by perfectibility, reconstruct his argument for it, and examine popular reactions to the ideal.
Godwin wrote Political Justice in the atmosphere following the French Revolution. At the time, thinkers like Condorcet and Paine were advocating for the upending of monarchical rule in favor of elective representation and democratic ideals, as shown in Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1795) and Paine’s Rights of Man (1791), while conservatives such as Burke, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), argued for gradual reform within the traditional monarchies. Godwin empathized with the former, but sought a philosophical foundation for human progress independent of government systems to bring about virtue.
As Mark Philp notes, Godwin aimed to derive “a science of morality and government from reason alone” (Philp 1986, p. 14).
At the same time, Godwin was a necessitarian. He believed every event, including human choice, is determined by prior causes. Godwin calls himself a necessitarian, but he uses the concept in a softer way, closer to the causal principle. For Godwin, the fact that everything is determined doesn’t mean you can’t change things, it just means that any change you bring about must itself be part of the causal chain. For example, your decision to educate someone, persuade them, or reform society is itself a cause. That decision is determined by previous causes. So although nothing happens in the sense of being uncaused, human reason and knowledge are causal forces that can transform future events.
This determinism is the foundation for his argument for moral progress towards what he coins perfectibility. He argues that once we understand how motives and opinions shape behavior, we gain the ability to intervene intelligently in that causal network. Godwin says, “The more we know of the law of necessity, the better we shall understand how to regulate our own conduct and that of others” (Political Justice, Bk IV, ch. 2). Godwin defines perfectibility as the “susceptibility of improvement” (Political Justice, Bk I ch. 4). It does not mean that humans can attain absolute perfection, only that there is no assignable limit to their capacity for advancement.
This advancement not only follows naturally, but indefinitely. In Political Justice (Book I, ch. 4), he points to past progress, in science, morality, and social organization, as empirical evidence that improvement is both real and ongoing.
Godwin writes, “The history of the human species has been a history of gradual improvement. Every step in improvement prepares the way for that which is to follow; there is no term to the progress of truth.”
Each advance has come from greater use of reason and understanding. If human nature had a fixed boundary, progress would have stopped long ago. But the opposite has happened, every century has brought advances in knowledge, virtue, and freedom. Therefore, there is no reason to assume a natural endpoint. Therefore, there is no limit to human perfectibility.
Godwin’s view entails a revolutionary political implication. Coercive government along with property inequalities and hereditary privilege deform opinion by rewarding self-interest. True justice therefore requires the gradual dissolution of these institutions.
“Government by its very nature counteracts the improvement of original mind,” Godwin insists (Bk V ch. 1).
When Godwin says “original mind,” he means the natural, rational capacity each person has for independent thought and moral judgment. The perfectible society, therefore, is an anarchic one, not chaotic, but ordered by reason and voluntary cooperation.
As Isaac Kramnick observes, Godwin’s radicalism “rests not on violent revolution but on the quiet subversion of opinion” (Kramnick 1972, p. 117).
In this case, opinion is not just casual belief or preference, it’s the collection of judgments, ideas, and beliefs that determine conduct, both individually and collectively. Reform must therefore target opinion itself: change the way people think, and the need for coercion disappears. When opinion aligns with truth, individuals act impartially for the common good, which Godwin coins rational benevolence. Reason exposes private interest as irrational because it conflicts with universal happiness.
“Justice is the sum of all virtue,” Godwin writes (Bk II ch. 3).
Thus perfectibility is both psychological and ethical, understanding truth leads necessarily to doing good. Together these steps yield the conclusion that moral and social progress are indefinite. Improvement is constrained only by error, and error is removable by reason.
The optimism of Political Justice provoked immediate response. Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) argued that biological limits, food supply and reproduction, would inevitably frustrate moral perfectibility. Malthus’s worry is that even if everyone started out rational and benevolent, the pressure of scarcity would eventually force people back into selfish behavior. Godwin replied in Of Population (1820), conceding empirical difficulties but reaffirming his central thesis that human intellect can eventually regulate even population by rational foresight. He insists that “the power of mind over the brute world is indefinite” (Godwin 1820, p. 15).
Perfectibility is later challenged by psychology and sociology. Sigmond Freud argued that human behavior is shaped by unconscious drives, ideology, and social structures, meaning reason isn’t transparent or purely rational.
Kramnick (1972) rightly observes that Godwin’s utopia “exists in the real world only as an attitude.” However, Godwin’s doctrine of perfectibility avoids appeals to divine grace or innate virtue by locating reform in opinion rather than force; he anticipates modern liberal and anarchist theories of non-coercive cooperation. As an ideal, it remains beautifully compelling, portraying human beings not as fallen creatures but as thinkers capable of remaking themselves through truth.
| Term | Definition |
| Perfectibility | The indefinite capacity of human beings for moral and intellectual improvement through reason (Political Justice, Bk 1, ch. 4) |
| Necessitarianism | The view that all events, including human actions, are determined by prior causes; for Godwin, this guarantees that improved knowledge yields improved behavior. |
| Rational Benevolence | Acting from impartial reason to promote the greatest general good. |
| Opinion | The ensemble of beliefs guiding conduct; reforming opinion is the chief means of social progress. |
| Political Justice | A condition where institutions conform to reason and equality, making coercive government unnecessary. |
| Coercion | The use of force or authority that corrupts moral autonomy and slows improvement. |
| Virtue | Conduct flowing from enlightened reason and benevolence rather than passion or self-interest |